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INTRODUCTION 
In this Reply Brief, Carolyn Boies shall show that the 
Defendant/Respondent Cass Bettinger's Brief has failed to address 
the issues before the Court based upon the evidence submitted at 
trial, has not employed legal arguments applicable to the issues 
on appeal and has generally failed to rebut the legal arguments 
and evidence relating thereto presented by Carolyn Boies on each 
point. Mrs. Boies has clearly and adequately demonstrated that 
the trial court erred when modifying the Decree of Divorce on 
April 21, 1987. 
This Brief shall address the legal arguments presented 
by Cass Bettinger in the order in which each argument is raised 
in Respondent's Brief. 
==sa^  A COURT'S MODIFICATION OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE 
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A SHOWING OF "SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court, on several occasions, has held 
that a modification of a Decree of Divorce must be supported by 
a showing of the moving party that there has been a "substantial 
change in circumstances." Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 
592, 594 (Utah 1983). After a showing of substantial change in 
circumstances, the Court must enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which shows that the Court's judgment follows 
logically from, and is supported by the evidence. Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Under Point I., parts A. 
and B., Cass Bettinger argues that the lower court in this matter 
was somehow exempt from these requirements. 
The four arguments advanced show the weakness of 
Hettinger's position and mirror the problems and confused record 
in this matter. 
Bettinger first argues that paragraph 1 of the April 21, 
1987, Order, changing visitation rights could not be construedas 
a modification since the structured visitation schedule insti-
tuted by the Court was within the scope of "reasonable 
visitation." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5, 6.) However, 
Bettinger's argument ignores the structured visitation schedule 
previously ordered by the Honorable John Rokich, September 25, 
1985, after a two-day trial on the issue concluding February 1, 
1985. The issue of "reasonable visitation" was not before the 
Court and the change in visitation was a modification of the 
September 25, 1985# Order modifying the qriginal Decree of 
Divorce. 
paragraph 4 of the April 21, 1987, Order did nothing more than 
give legal construction to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original 
Decree and, therefore, was not a "modification" of the Decree. u>>o*^ « 
The argument totally ignores the evidence presented and positions 
taken by the parties before the Court. This issue was clearly 
the major issue between the parties. Prior to the April 21 
hearing, each party repeatedly presented argument on the issue 
and memorandum in support of their position. The Court's April 
21 Order ultimately resulted in a significant change in financial 
circumstances between the parties and the court erroneously 
setting aside a judgment in favor of Mrs. Boies for past due 
child support. The impact of the Courtfs Order was a significant 
change of the original Decree of Divorce which did not rely on 
the evidence before the Court. The Court's order on the issue 
warranted entry of findings and conclusions as a decision of a 
substantial point in controversy between the parties. 
The third argument advanced is that Mrs. Boies waived 
objections to the Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on its Order since it was not raised before 
the lower court. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) Although the 
"waiver" argument simply is not applicable, the best reply is 
that failure to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
a modification of Decree of Divorce is properly raised on appeal. 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The final argument raised by Bettinger is that the 
court's interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 was made as a matter 
of law which exempted the court from entering Findings and 
Conclusions thereon. However, where the Court goes beyond the 
four corners of the document for its interpretation, i.e. 
receiving additional evidence in the form of Affidavit from Mrs. 
Boies, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by the 
respective parties, the Court's interpretation is appropriately 
based on matters other than intent gleaned from the wording of 
the Decree. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-2 
(Utah 1981). The Court's final determination on the issue, as 
with all other significant issues raised at trial court, must be 
supported by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law unless the 
f^cts in the recordare "clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the Judgment." Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). In the case before the 
Court, the only evidence submitted on the point of intent of the 
parties was Mrs. Boies Affidavit which is clearly contrary to the 
Court's interpretation. 
II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ORDER VISITATION AS SUBMITTED 
IN DEFENDANT'S APRIL 21, 1987, PROPOSED ORDER 
The record reflects that the Court, when addressing the 
issue of visitation, intended only that the Defendant's visita-
tion be a "standard descriptive visitation commonly used in the 
district." (April transcript, lines 2-4.) 
In the March 24, 1987, Order to Show Cause proceeding, 
when addressing the issues of Defendant's visitation, the only 
reference made by the Court to visitation is found at page 27, 
lines 1-6 when the Court stated: 
"I will enter a Cgpecif ic„iirder of visitation. 
It is common that this Court enter Orders of visi-
tation every other weekend and alternate red-letter 
holidays and half of Christmas and six weeks in the 
summer. I am willing to put all of that in an 
Order if your counsel cannot otherwise agree. That 
will be the specific Order of this Court." 
Next, when considering the issue of visitation, the 
Court stated in the April 9, 1987, hearing: 
"So as you understand it then, the three issues to 
be determined are first, visitation, which the 
court indicated that it would follow if they needed 
a specific Order of the standard descriptive visi-
tation commonly used in the district." 
(April 9, 1987, transcript, p. 5, 1. 25; p. 6, 1.1-4.) 
Bettinger's attorney then argues: 
"Thank you, your Honor. I think the Court's 
correct on the matters that have been resolved. It 
was my understanding, however, the Visitation Order 
was basically every other weekend, alternating red-
letter holidays, six weeks in the summer and I had 
understood a weekday evening during the week that 
there wasn't a weekend visitation—a very brief 
one, maybe on Wednesdays. That was my recollec-
tion." 
(April 9, 1987f Transcript, p. 6f 1. 22-25; p. 7, 1. 1-4.) 
The Court's next statement regarding visitation is: 
"In terms of every other weekend, it is clearly not 
possible for him to anticipate an opportunity to 
utilize that amount of visitation nor is it con-
sistent to think he is going to be here on the odd 
week to have a Wednesday night or some other kind 
of visitation. So what's really going to happen 
here is, if these people are immature as they are 
and they have shown, they are going to create con-
fusion in the mind of a 10-year-old child, that, I 
think will create a tragedy." 
(April 9, 1987, Transcript, p. 15, 1. 7-15.) 
The Court concluded the issue on visitation by the 
following Order: "Now, on visitation, I will grant the spe-
cific order." (April 9, 1987, Transcript, p. 21, 1. 3.) 
The Court's reference to "specific order" is that Order 
normally employed by the Third District Court which the Judge 
initially referred to at the start of the hearing (Transcript, 
p. 6), when he stated: "If they need a specific Order of 
standard descriptive visitation commonly used in the district." 
Any additional visitation which Defendant's counsel included in 
the visitation Order is beyond the scope of that Ordered by the 
Court and finds no basis in the transcript. The Judge had simply 
indicated that he would sign no other Order except that which was 
a "standard order" as he understood that term in relation to the 
Third District Court. No objections to the proposed Order were 
necessary after th^^rial court judge indicated he would not sign 
the Order. 
III. 
THE COURT'S ORDER INTERPRETING PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 
DOES NOT REFLECT PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION 
OR EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT 
Cass Bettinger argues that the Court could determine the 
intent of the parties from the plain wording of paragraphs 7 and 
8. Therefore, resort to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary. 
(Appellant's Brief, pages 12, 13 and 14.) However, a simple 
review of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original Decree of Divorce 
makes that position untenable. 
When this appellate court reviews paragraphs 7 and 8, it 
will become clear that it is impossible to determine the intent 
of the parties by the language of the two-paragraph order for the 
terms involved. There are several logical interpretations from 
the language and the ambiguity cannot be resolved without 
reference to extrinsic evidence. In fact, if a literal reading 
of paragraph 7 is argued for, the last sentence clearly indicates 
that "two-thirds of the house payments" will be an additional 
amount of child support to the Plaintiff since nowhere does it 
indicate that there is a decrease in child support based upon the 
occurrence of any of the enumerated events. 
Cass Bettinger1s Brief engages in a series of arguments 
based upon a variety of scenarios, none of which can be proven to 
have been the case without resort to extrinsic evidence. For 
instance, paragraph 1 on page 14 begins, "The parties could not 
have intended the interpretation asserted by the Plaintiffs" 
The only method to determine that the parties "could not have 
intended" the language would be resort to other evidence to clear 
up the ambiguity. Logic, especially in the paragraph presented 
by the Respondent's Brief, clearly does not prevail. 
Next, Bettinger requests this Court to take a form of 
judicial recognition of some theoretical situation when he 
states: "It is common knowledge that if a divorced woman 
remarries, she thereby attains an additional source of support 
through the earning capacity of her new husband." Although such 
may commonly be the case, that was not the evidence before the 
Court. Also, judicial notice is simply not appropriate for facts 
and assumptions regarding negotiations of a divorce Decree unless 
supported by a legal presumption or other facts submitted on the 
point. 
Finally, regarding the Respondent's argument that the 
intent of the parties is clear from the language of the Decree, 
Bettinger argues that the language is somehow justified by some 
alleged tax consequences considered by the parties. However, it 
is unclear how the language of the Decree makes "adjustments for 
pre-tax or pre-marriage tax consequences." This is true in that 
Bettinger continued to receive tax benefits for mortgage payments 
on the house until it was eventually sold. 
In conclusion, the Respondent presents no cogent 
argument that the Court was able to divine the intent of the par-
ties from the language of the Decree and that it, therefore, 
followed the normal principles of document interpretation set 
forth in Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). 
The only extrinsic evidence befqre the Court on the 
issue of interpretation of paragraphs 7 apd 8 was the Affidavit 
submitted by Mrs. Boies. Mrs. Boies' Affidavit detailed the nego-
tiation, tradeoffs and basis for the language in paragraphs 7 and 
8. That basis was that Mr. Bettinger desired to maintain the 
home as an investment, but Mrs. Boies desired significantly 
higher child support than originally agreed to. As a trade off, 
Mrs. Boies agreed to lower the child support, allow Mr. Bettinger 
to maintain the home as an investment by having a lien which 
increased or decreased in value to the dat^ e of sale and agreeing 
to an increase in child support by two-thi|rds of the amount of 
the mortgage payment upon the occurrence df one of the enumerated 
events. It must be recalled that the parties assumed the home 
would sell in a relatively quick fashion and the parties would 
reap some monetary benefit from the sale. 
Mr. Bettinger submitted no Affidavit or other evidence 
on the point except the proffer of counsel found in the March 24, 
1987, transcript on page 4, beginning at line 25. 
The court's interpretation was inconsistent with the evi-
dence submitted and resulted in setting aside a judgment which 
had previously been entered for past due child support in the 
amount of $2,707.00. The Court's Order should be reversed and an 
Order entered granting Mrs. Boies Judgment for past due child 
support based upon the amounts set forth in Exhibit "A" or 
Exhibit "B" of her primary Brief on Appeal. 
DATED this £Ct day of July, 1988. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By 
E^TAULWOOD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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